

Chapter 1
Towards defence of the status quo
(1930 — 1932)

I

During the first decade after the Great War, the Communist prophecies about the Paris peace settlement having been built on a volcano remained minority views. The diplomacy of the 20s was centered on the liquidation of past injustices and could claim considerable successes achieved on this path. Easing of international tensions, impressive signs of economic prosperity and of reappearing class harmony largely concealed the fact that a very particular power balance on which the peace treaties were based and which they were to preserve was melting away rapidly.

The alliance, which had crushed the Central Powers in 1918, disintegrated. America's return to Europe after 1923 and her financial and disarmament diplomacy fell far short of full participation in international cooperation. Dissatisfied with her share of the war spoils, Italy was turning under Fascism to Balkan and Mediterranean agendas of the pre-Caesarian Rome. Britain, the only superpower of this era¹, faced a number of serious challenges: slow economic growth and political instability at home, the rise of indigenous nationalism overseas, and the dominion's demands for greater autonomy. Japanese and Soviet involvement in the Chinese civil wars forced London and Paris to think about defending their traditional interests in East Asia and the Pacific. France, overburdened by her postwar commitments to client states in Central Europe, steadily retreated from her earlier goal of continental hegemony and took refuge in half-sincere Briandist hopes for enduring reconciliation between the victors and vanquished. Feuds between successor states, with slow economic growth and, in most cases, obsolete social structures further weakened the "sanitary cordon" between Germany and Soviet Russia. Deprived of its colonies and some European possessions, Germany exploited "the singular advantage" of being the only continental power with no full-fledged responsibilities overseas to focus her energy on relations with neighbors². She capitalized on the injustices of the Versailles Treaty and paid little on the Entente bills. After France had to give up hopes of gaining security guaranties, the Locarno Treaty of 1925 provided both

France and Germany with Anglo-Italian obligations of assistance in case of aggression from the other party of the agreement. The following year, the Germans were invited to join the League of Nations and took a permanent seat on its Council. Similarly, reconsideration of the Dawes Plan for reparations and war debts settlement, which started in 1929, provided a further sign that the distribution of power was shifting in Germany's favor. In 1922, shattered by wars and revolutions and having failed to come to terms with the Allies, Germany and Russia signed the treaty of Rapallo, which announced mutual diplomatic recognition and withdrawal of economic claims on each other³. For a decade, mutual geopolitical interests, preoccupation with their security and hatred of the Versailles system had provided a basis for their cooperation. Russo-German bonds suffered as a result of the Locarno agreement, and from 1925 on, both sides watched each other's moves to the West intensely. The conclusion of the Berlin Treaty of non-aggression and consultations in April 1926 was as substantial as it was demonstrative of Russia and Germany's "community of fate". Reciprocal obligations spelled out in the treaty included a pledge of non-participation in combinations inimical to the other party. Preservation of the special German-Soviet relationship remained indispensable for both Berlin and Moscow as a lever in negotiations with France and Britain and as insurance in the event that these powers would betray their hopes.

The driving force behind Rapallo steadily diminished as Stresemann and Curtius reoriented their main efforts to the west. Moscow's concerns whether the German connection would be able to help avert the an anti-Soviet bloc rather than stimulate Western reconciliation with Germany grew as the overall power balance shifted to Germany's advantage. By the beginning of the 30s Moscow and Berlin viewed their positive mutual interests as also declining. Even before the first signs of the economic recession, the German Government began to reappraise its view that friendly relations with the USSR would contribute to political stability at home. Having eliminated the opposition and entered the period of collectivization, the Stalin leadership considered the German presence in the Soviet Union a disturbing factor. Economic projects and trade relations with the USSR had proved disappointing for German business. Moscow was convinced of the value of German industry for its programmes of reconstruction, but actively expanded and diversified its economic ties with other countries because of fears of Russia's growing dependence on German credits. Opportunities presented by military cooperation were also viewed differently by the parties. While the Reichwehr urged against a political disengagement from Russia by referring to Germany's military interests in multifaceted cooperation with her, by 1927 the Politburo agreed with the Red Army high command that "military cooperation with the Germans gives us practically nothing" and called for its scope to be gradually reduced⁴.

All these factors were brought to the fore in the early 1930, "a watershed year" in the general European transition from the post-war era to a pre-war one⁵. Since late 1929, the Soviet commentaries had admitted the existence of "a Rapallo crisis". As the Young Plan for debts and reparations was submitted for the Reichstag's approval, in the Soviet Embassy, "questions were being asked about how long [they] would be able to remain in Berlin"⁶. Moscow in no way confined its observations of increasing predicaments to mutual incidents or the German press campaign. These were seen as reflecting tectonic changes of the European scene.

Both the Bolsheviks' ultimate goal of worldwide social transformation and their utter realism in the conduct of foreign policy had led them to adopt a peculiar variation of the traditional balance-of-power approach. "*Our policy is to support the feeble,*" was the formula coined by Georgiy Chicherin, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to define Soviet approach to world affairs⁷. The accelerated corrosion of the Versailles power balance and the increased German self-assurance resulted in a new Soviet foreign policy dilemma. The lead article in the Narkomindel's journal described the change in following words:

"Between the Germany of 1930 and the Germany of Rapallo times, the distance is immense. At Rapallo we were faced with the Germany that had lost the war. Later, there was before us the Germany that had fallen into the clutches of Entente imperialism, and, inasmuch as this imperialism presented Shylock reparation bills and shifted all the burdens of the defeat in the world war onto the shoulders of the German toiling masses, and as the then official Germany seemed to offer resistance to these efforts — in these circumstances, we could not but show Germany sympathy. And that was not all. The pressure went apace with the material support that the Entente rendered to the Russian counter-revolution. But with the lapse of time the social and economic face of Germany was radically changed. [...] From the bones of the petty bourgeoisie, battered upon the blood of the working class, arose the Germany of monopolistic financial and industrial capital. *There was born neo-imperial Germany [...] Then Germany was only the object of the imperialist policy. Now she is the subject of this policy*"⁸.

The Narkomindel conceded that German imperialism still played "a subservient role" in comparison with the superimperialism of the United States, Britain and France, but saw this difference being of little significance for Soviet policy. The Western and anti-Bolshevik tendencies, solely by their existence, might create a situation, "in which our Soviet public must ask itself, *whether the moment has not come, when we ought to cease making a cardinal distinction between Germany and other imperialist countries*"⁹.

The summer of 1930 saw the revival of Russo-German cooperation, but this was largely due to particular worries from both sides and their economic inter-

ests. The political significance of the Rapallo treaty being steadily reduced to each other's recognition "as quite independent subjects of world politics"¹⁰⁻¹¹, the strategic partnership was on the decline¹². From the German point of view, "the only positive factor that [had] remained in Russo-German relations" was one in the field of *Ostpolitik*, primarily a shared interest in the Polish question¹³.

After 1918, the question of the Poles, which the partitioning powers had long considered a stabilising factor of their relations, had been transformed into a problem of independent Poland. The Treaty of Versailles defined her western frontiers to include "the Polish corridor", which separated Eastern Prussia from mainland Germany. Poland obtained direct access to the Baltic and, after three uprisings and a plebiscite in 1921, a part of Upper Silesia. The peace settlement left about a million ethnic Germans in restored Poland and twice as many Poles in Germany. It was, however, Germany which laid claims for regaining "lost" territories and was united in this demand. From 1925 on, Germany consistently exerted pressure on Poland to prepare ground for territorial revision. With the German Reichstag's failure to ratify the trade treaty with Poland, which had been signed in March 1930, a leading Polish diplomat stated, "there came to an end a period in Polish-German relations marked by endeavors of the Polish government to establish by means of direct negotiations some sort of normal coexistence between the two countries"¹⁴.

As a result of the 1920 war with Soviet Russia, the reborn Polish Republic had acquired the areas of Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia¹⁵). The ensuing Riga peace treaty was, in a sense, a compromise between historical Polish claims and the ethnic composition of the territories in dispute: it awarded Poland with five million of Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Byelorussians¹⁶. Seen from a wider perspective, "the settlement was a disaster for one side and a defeat for the other" because it "put an end to both the grandiose program of Pilsudski and to the Bolshevik goal of a European revolution"¹⁷.

Soviet perception of Poland and the policy to be adopted toward her seemed to be infinitely complex. The principle of "support for the feeble" was probably nowhere more difficult to apply, and nowhere was the interdependence between Great Powers diplomacy and security for European Soviet territory more tangible.

In the general world and European context, Poland was primarily seen as a party to the Versailles bloc against whom German antagonism was to be fortified. Poland's 1921 alliance with France was intended to keep Germany in check; Moscow resisted it also as offering access to Soviet western frontiers for future capitalist intervention. Such a course was also intended to prevent a German *rapprochement* with France and Britain, which could bring their expeditionary corps to Bug at a time of crisis. In December 1924, after their strong warnings failed to discourage Stresemann from seeking a western security agreement, the Soviets suggested that "a common German-Russian pressure

could be brought to bear on Poland" and welcomed the Brockdorf-Rantzau's allusion "that the solution of the Polish question by Germany and Russia was to push Poland to her ethnographic frontiers"¹⁸.

Viewed as an independent player in Central Europe, Poland needed and deserved Soviet support. In September 1925, the Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs went to Warsaw to propose a bilateral non-aggression pact¹⁹, because, as leading Soviet publicist Carl Radek explained, with Germany moving toward the West, "Soviet diplomacy [had] no reason whatsoever to weaken Poland"²⁰. Further talks were little affected by the *coup d'état* which brought Pilsudski to power. A nineteenth-century-type dictator, Józef Pilsudski was opposed to totalitarian patterns and, as a realist, did not allow "romantic" and "federalist" conceptions to influence practical policy²¹. Actual non-aggression negotiations between Moscow and Warsaw began in August 1926. They were subjected to fluctuations in Soviet-German relations, but failed to be completed with signing largely because of Moscow's refusal to agree to Polish demands for simultaneous Soviet treaties with Finland, Latvia, and Estonia. Formation of a Baltic bloc under Polish leadership would be seen by the USSR as a united capitalist coalition in miniature, and she was anxious to prevent even this smaller version of anti-Soviet bloc from materializing²². As a result, then, the talks with Poland were suspended in January 1928.

Meanwhile, the Soviets reaffirmed their support for the weaker side in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. Kaunas refused to recognize Polish occupation of the Vilnius (Wilno) district in 1920 despite Conference of Ambassadors' decision three years later, which settled the issue to Poland's satisfaction. Tiny Lithuania, which preferred an official state of war to opening diplomatic relations with Poland, received additional Russian support to her cause when, at the signing of non-aggression treaty in September 1926, letters were exchanged between the two countries' Foreign Ministers²³.

On the fourth level of analysis, the "support of the feeble" principle led Moscow to instigate, through the Communist International, the nationalist movements in the Polish "eastern kresy"²⁴. Soviet apprehensions about agreements between Warsaw and leaders of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Ruthenian minority movements were kept alive by relatively good treatment by the Polish authorities of the Ukrainian National Democratic Organization, which was working for the secession of the Soviet Ukraine and the creation of an autonomous Ukrainian state under Polish protection²⁵.

As the twenties continued, the different elements of the Soviet policy towards Poland were being partly reconciled. After Rakovski's 1924 statement in London concerning the USSR's non-recognition of the incorporation of the Eastern Galicia into Poland²⁶, the Narkomindel kept Soviet territorial claims in a state of dormancy. When, in 1931-1932, the Polish authorities took strong measures against peasant uprisings and the nationalist campaigns in the eastern lands (the notorious "pacifications"), the Soviets remained unmoved²⁷. The dif-

difficulties with Soviet preferential treatment toward Lithuania and with Polish insistence on alignment with the Baltic States were partly surmounted after Voldemaras, the Lithuanian prime minister, suggested to Moscow signing a regional agreement to render the Briand-Kellogg pact immediately effective²⁸. Litvinov seized on this idea and approached Poland with the proposal²⁹. After numerous diplomatic exchanges, Moscow agreed to sign such accord simultaneously with Poland, Rumania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Litvinov Protocol of February 1929, which Kaunas joined later, was the first international act to which both Poland and the Soviet Union had become parties. While reappraising its policy on the "Great Powers politics" level as well, the USSR passed the landmark of 1930 by moving toward Warsaw.

II

In July 1930, the threat of Rhineland occupation, which for twelve years had been "held over Germany's head, necessitating the patient indirect policy of Stresemann" was removed; the electoral campaign to the Reichstag was dominated by demands for territorial revision and rearmament³⁰. Significantly, the Rhineland evacuation coincided with the long anticipated changes in the Narkomindel. Maxim Litvinov, since 1927 *de facto* Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, officially replaced the ailing Chicherin. Disappearance from the political scene of this most ardent proponent of the Rapallo was partly balanced by the return of the like-minded Krestinski, after nine years in Berlin, to assume the duties of First Deputy Commissar. The new Soviet ambassador to Germany, Leo Khinchuk, was "preeminently an economist" and after his poor performance in 1917, had not been politically prominent. The Second Deputy Commissar in charge of Eastern affairs, Leo Karakhan, and the fourth member of the NKID's collegium, Boris Stomoniakov — who since 1926 had been responsible for Soviet relations with Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian states — retained their positions³¹. Litvinov's nomination symbolized a re-orientation of the Soviet policy from courting semi-colonial nations of the East and rivalry with Great Britain to active engagement in European politics³².

In 1926, J. Pilsudski foresaw five calm years, which Poland could "spare for our military and internal work", while refraining from "any important initiative"³³. With the September elections in Germany, this period was almost completed. Since October 1930, the Polish foreign minister, August Zaleski, and the envoy to Moscow, Stanislaw Patek, expressed the desire "to do something to improve the relations" with the USSR³⁴. Conversations between Antonov-Ovseenko, the new Soviet envoy to Warsaw³⁵, and Zaleski revealed a mutual desire for improved relations and stabilization between the two countries. Later Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko was to recall that by 1931

"the situation had ripened to such an extent that, sounding out in accordance with you [i.e. the NKID's instructions], I received from Zaleski (a careful official, unable to play with the name of the Marshal) that Pilsudski was ready for a far-reaching *rapprochement* with us, ready to conclude a non-aggression pact and a trade treaty and that concrete proposals would be submitted to us in two weeks"³⁶.

The Poles interpreted these Soviet moves as amounting to the proposal to resume non-aggression negotiations³⁷. According to the Director of the Eastern Division of the Polish Foreign Ministry Colonel Schaetzel, "the suggestion" was made to him that "the Soviet Government had represented to the German Government that the present negotiations had not emanated from [the] side of Russia"³⁸. Zaleski, however, communicated the substance of the Soviet-Polish exchanges to his Rumanian ally; soon after, the Rumanian press released a report about Soviet initiatives in opening negotiations on a political agreement with Warsaw. The fears that the Poles merely wanted to leave them in an embarrassing position and damage their relations with Germany made the Soviets demand discretion from Warsaw and deny the press reports. As Antonov-Ovseenko reminded Stomoniakov in 1933, when Poland met difficulty in Bucharest, "you had seen in this (the Romanian hue and cry) a Polish intrigue. 'Tass' and then C. Litvinov in Berlin tried seriously to calm the Germans. I received from C. Krestinski a directive: Rapallo is the axis of our whole policy. C. Litvinov added: we are at risk of losing the concrete in Germany, while gaining nothing in Poland"³⁹.

The Poles refrained from displaying active interest in a non-aggression pact, and from January 1931 until late in the summer, negotiations with Russia were suspended. Preliminary and confidential talks seem to continue in Warsaw⁴⁰ — at least, such was the impression in Berlin⁴¹. The NKID tried to allay German fears by transmitting to the German Embassy the basic provisions of the Soviet draft, which were to be discussed with Poland later⁴². Pilsudski, meanwhile, was undecided what form a Soviet-Polish detente should take. August Zaleski in February and May of 1931 made public statements about the Polish desire to improve relations with her eastern neighbor. The minister, however, simultaneously favored stronger Polish alignment with France and Rumania. Stanislaw Patek, who represented Poland in Moscow since 1926 thought the Kellogg Pact and the Litvinov Protocol, if complemented by a bilateral conciliation convention, would be "entirely adequate" as a basis for Polish-Russian relations⁴³. Both tended to agree with the French foreign minister that a Polish pact with the USSR should take the form of an "eastern Locarno", "combining the general provisions of the Briand-Kellogg Pact with [the creation of] a commission of investigation and conciliation"⁴⁴.

The announcement of plans for the Austro-German customs union and the voting of funds for Germany's naval program in March 1931 stirred the French

to approach the Soviet representative in Paris with an invitation for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Stalin and Litvinov promptly accepted the proposal⁴⁵, and on August 10, the Franco-Soviet non-aggression treaty was initialled. From the very beginning, the Soviet diplomats understood that the Paris talks would inevitably lead to the Polish issue; Litvinov and Dovgalevski, the Russian ambassador to France were surprised that Briand had been evading it⁴⁶. In mid-June, Briand professed to an American diplomat that "very recently the Russians had consented to examine favorably the negotiations" of an "Eastern Locarno" and that the discussions were in progress "between [himself], the Soviet Ambassador, and the representatives of Poland and Rumania"⁴⁷. However, the French foreign minister's statements seem to have been based more on wishful thinking than on facts: although the Soviets had reasons to anticipate a corresponding Polish move, they were not told that France intended to establish a formal link between French and Polish pacts with Russia⁴⁸.

On August 4, Patek broke the silence by communicating his government's intention to submit the draft of a non-aggression treaty. After asking the envoy about its main lines, Karakhan sternly stated that he saw no sense in discussing Polish plans for collective negotiations between the USSR and her western neighbors⁴⁹. After securing the prolongation of the Berlin Treaty in June 1931 and initialling the non-aggression pact with France the Narkomindel was weighing all possible combinations, which could prevent Russia's becoming a pawn in a Franco-German game⁵⁰. The August 23 proposal by the Polish Government to negotiate on the basis of its slightly revised 1926 draft opened few prospects for the Soviets, while increasing the risk of alienating Germany. In Moscow's view — as communicated by TASS — the Polish proposal "represent[ed] not a step forward but a step back"⁵¹. The press in Berlin received the news about the completion of Franco-Soviet non-aggression talks calmly, but reports of impending negotiations between Poland and Russia caused quite an outcry there. The Polish press unanimously greeted the envisaged non-aggression pacts as a mortal blow to the Berlin treaty and the Rapallo ties, thus freeing Poland from a nightmare of strategic encirclement⁵². In 1926, then German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, stressed to the Russians that their agreement to "meet in any way Poland's need for securing her eastern [sic] boundary" was incompatible with the Treaty of Berlin and would be considered a hostile act. During the previous round of Soviet-Polish negotiations, in 1926-1927, the Germans had contested arguments concerning the USSR's desire for security from Poland by pointing out that this must be based on Germany's "well known attitude toward Poland and Russia's armed strength". Adhering to his concept of close partnership with Germany, Chicherin dared not speak about general provisions for non-violability of Polish territory because of Berlin's claims that even recognition of Poland's eastern border would threaten key German interests which lay in preparing ground for eventual revision of the Versailles Treaty⁵³. Those ob-

jections were subsequently reiterated in a seven-point note which the German ambassador handed Litvinov in the beginning of April 1931⁵⁴.

While seriously exploring the possibilities of reconciliation with Poland in 1926-1927, the Soviet diplomacy evaded German attacks by calling the Polish initiatives "ridiculous" and characterizing their own overtures to Poland as being of "a pronounced propaganda character"⁵⁵. Litvinov clung to the same tactic in late August 1931, when he went to Berlin to publicly deny any change in the Soviet attitude toward Germany and to assure her that Moscow did not consider the Polish proposal worth negotiating. On August 28, he listened to the warning from the foreign minister, J. Curtius, (and similar cautions some days later from a senior official of the *Auswärtige Amt*) about the grave consequences, which a pact with Warsaw would have for the Russo-German relationship⁵⁶. Then Litvinov proceeded to Geneva to tell the French that the Soviet government was "always ready to conclude with Poland a non-aggression pact on the same conditions as with France"⁵⁷.

In ensuing meetings in September and October the French told Moscow that the signing of their treaty with the USSR was dependent on the Soviet-Polish agreement. To the Soviets' embarrassment, in the dispute between Zaleski and Deputy Minister Józef Beck, Pilsudski supported the latter, and the controversy ended with increased Polish demands. After some hesitation, Warsaw refused to negotiate on the basis of the Franco-Russian text and insisted on returning to her own draft as well as to the "round table" principle of inviting all European neighbors of the USSR to participate in non-aggression negotiations⁵⁸. Moscow was unlikely to accept the second condition and by the middle of November no progress had been achieved. Reasons for the Soviet leaders' eventual decision to meet some of the Polish demands are open for speculation because in the fall there appeared a new factor.

In mid-September 1931, the Kwantung Army Command, using the Mukden incident as a pretext for their actions, began an all-out offensive to seize Manchuria and soon established control over some Russian-run sections of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In diplomatic and press circles, it was widely believed that with chaos and immediate danger to the Soviet Far East, the need for enforced security guarantees in Europe had become a priority for the Russian leaders⁵⁹. Owing to the paucity of solid evidence, this question can not be answered definitely⁶⁰, but the Japanese aggression undoubtedly stimulated the Russians' willingness to reach an agreement with Poland.

The November 14 conversation between Patek and Litvinov clarified their respective positions and signalled the start of active negotiations. The Polish representative hinted that his government would not insist on mentioning its obligations before the League of Nations, nor upon concluding the arbitration convention concerning international procedure for settling future Soviet-Polish disputes, provided that the question of Russia's pacts with the Baltic States and

Rumania were satisfactorily settled. Maxim Litvinov reciprocated by agreeing to conduct parallel negotiations with them. In late December, with Poland acting as intermediary, discussions were started between Russia and Finland and Latvia, while Boris Stomoniakov went to Riga for talks with a Rumanian representative⁶¹. This problem being on the right track, Soviet-Polish discussions, interrupted by Patek's trips to Warsaw to report to his superiors, went relatively smoothly. The Narkomindel was agreeable on most controversial issues⁶².

In the debates surrounding the first article of the draft treaty, which established both sides' refusal to initiate war, Litvinov agreed, as his opposite number Zaleski had suggested in 1927, to broaden the definition of aggression (second paragraph, first article) by adopting the formula of a leading Finnish expert in international law named Erich. According to this formula, "any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other Contracting Party" was to be regarded as contrary to obligations of non-aggression, even if such acts were "committed without a declaration of war and *avoided all warlike manifestations as far as possible*"⁶³. The NKID also revoked up its previous demand to replace the Polish formula of Article 2 about "rendering no assistance to the attacking side" by the neutrality obligation in the event that one of the parties was subjected to aggression by a third state⁶⁴. One more concession Litvinov and Stomoniakov made to their Polish counterparts was to include in the text an *alinea* providing for the right of each contracting party to denounce the pact without prior notice, if the other party committed "an act of aggression against a third state"⁶⁵.

The most serious difficulties in the negotiations were caused (as they had been in 1926-1927) by the problem posed by the provisions of the third article. The Russians were determined to obtain from the Poles a pledge not to participate "in any agreement, political or economic in its character, that would be aimed against the other party". However, Patek loyally carried out Warsaw's instructions not to make such a binding promise. After several rounds of polemics, a declaration was drawn, which forbade the contracting states from joining in agreements "openly hostile to the other side from the aggressive point of view"⁶⁶. Litvinov agreed to accept this modified formula of the third article on the condition that the Poles sign immediately. The Soviets improved their bargaining position by signing the non-aggression treaty with Finland on January 21 and scheduling the signing of the Soviet-Latvian agreement for the beginning of February. Poland's insistence that Russia must sign treaties with other border states simultaneously with Soviet-Polish pact was becoming obsolete, and Warsaw's claims for a leading role in the region was impaired. Discussions between Stomoniakov and the Rumanian representative, Count Sturdza, had reached the phase of drafting the text when, on January 20, Rumania demanded from the Russians a clear statement about the integrity of her territory. Despite

inner debates on this issue in the late 20s, Moscow had officially always refused to recognize the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Rumanian state until a plebiscite were held in this part of the former Russian empire. Soviet diplomacy avoided accepting any formulae which could be interpreted as indicating a change in its stance on the Bessarabian problem. At this point the Soviet-Rumanian talks, to which Poland had contributed in previous months, were broken⁶⁷. Pilsudski, who wished to have his pact with Russia serve as an example for Poland's neighbors⁶⁸, was disappointed, but nonetheless reluctant to continue with signing without Rumania. Upon his return from Warsaw, S. Patek informed Litvinov that he had received authority only to initial the text. The Foreign Commissar, giving vent to his ill feelings, bluntly replied: "I am not interested in initialling, and I prefer to freeze the negotiations"⁶⁹. The next day, however, Moscow yielded on this point⁷⁰, and on January 25, Patek and Krestinski initialed the Soviet-Polish non-aggression accord.

The Polish-Soviet negotiations demonstrated an almost unprecedented willingness by the USSR to reach an agreement with Warsaw. Moscow softened its traditional stance of avoiding taking steps which could be understood as recognizing Poland's leading role among the border states. The Russians agreed to a series of talks with their neighbors — evidently, "somewhat to the surprise, in the first instance, of the Poles themselves"⁷¹. Moreover, the Soviet leaders accepted the risk of bringing the fading Soviet-German relationship to the breaking point.

On the eve of the completion of the Soviet-Polish negotiations, the Germans used their influence in Bucharest, by encouraging Rumanians to raise their demands. German diplomats in Moscow had focused their efforts on preventing or, at least, weakening the Soviet-Polish agreement. Having nothing to offer Moscow in return for her abandoning the idea of a *détente* with Poland, Germany exerted unmasked pressure on her. In late December 1931, when the issue of the Polish pact had come up at a tea party on the occasion of Litvinov's visit to Berlin, the German Ambassador to the USSR, von Dirksen became immediately upset. The Counsellor of the Embassy, Yakoubovich, reported to the NKID that the ambassador,

"explained that some days of his stay in Berlin had given him enough time to become certain of degree to which the government and political quarters are disturbed by the progression of these [Soviet-Polish] negotiations and by the general atmosphere around them. There is no case to argue that we [the Soviets] can not give up the conclusion of the pact offered by the Poles. All here understand this, but at the same time they fear our concessions to Polish pretensions [...] ... he hopes to explain on his return to Moscow the seriousness of the situation with more success"⁷².

Two weeks later, the senior Foreign Ministry official R. Meyer clarified the German position, in an interview with Sergey Alexandrovski, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin:

"he [Meyer] must say frankly that in Moscow they, apparently, do not render themselves a proper account of the danger of the turn (Umsturz), which Moscow itself is going through.... he is compelled to state the creation of new situation which is in direct opposition to the founding principles of the Rapallo policy"⁷³.

Demonstrating their adherence to the provisions of the 1926 Berlin Treaty, Litvinov and his colleagues in late 1931 kept the Germans informed on the negotiations with the Poles. In an undated and unsigned note "Counter-remarks on the draft of Soviet-Polish negotiations", which represented the reply to Dirksen's "*Bemerkun-gen*" of April⁷⁴, the NKID argued that the Berlin Treaty would not be violated by the conclusion of a Soviet-Polish pact. The Russians pointed out that, since the pact left to each of the contracting parties the decision of whether the other side had committed an act of aggression against a third country, the USSR still maintained the legal right to determine her attitude *vis-à-vis* Poland in the event of future hostilities between Germany and Poland. On the problem of Soviet recognition of the Polish western boundary, Moscow stated:

"It is quite right that the obligation of non-aggression against a country means non-violation of her integrity and that is the reason why a special reference to non-violation of integrity is superfluous. But when one side proposes a formula dealing particularly with integrity's non-violation, it is absolutely impossible to object to such a formula and, even more to issue an ultimatum. This in no way means, however, that the obligation of non-violation is equal to the recognition of the correctness of frontiers and possessions"⁷⁵.

This rather academic explanation was accompanied by an assurance from Stalin himself, given in an exclusive interview with Emil Ludwig on December 13, that the USSR did not recognize the Versailles settlement whether or not a Soviet-Polish accord were concluded. Significantly, the official text of Stalin's statements appeared in the Soviet press only five months later, but the *Berliner Tagenblatt* was permitted to carry it on Christmas. In the conversation with Ludwig, the Party Secretary-General portrayed the pact with Poland as an inevitable consequence of the Soviet peace policy. As to the clause in question, in his view, without it "no pact can be concluded". Stalin assured Germany that "this is the most we can do" and that Russia would "never" guarantee Poland's frontiers⁷⁶. Dirksen was, or pretended to be, impressed, but his superiors were furious over Moscow's tricks, aimed at disguising the reorientation of Soviet policy in favor of anti-revisionist states while maintaining the possibility of political

cooperation with Germany. The Deputy Director of the German Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department in an exhausting conversation with Alexandrovski on the eve of 1932, "while assuring of his deepest respect for C. Stalin, stated bluntly that the explanation he had given to a 'certain Ludwig' did not have any state significance. This is a document about what Stalin thinks"⁷⁷. The Germans correctly gave little credit to the Soviets' complaints about their exposed position in the Far East and Polish interventionist designs, seeing those allegations as largely insincere⁷⁸.

On December 25, the Ministerial-Director of the *Auswärtige Amt* Gaus made it clear to Counsellor Yakoubovich that the Germans were not satisfied with Moscow's explanations of those points of the draft of the Soviet-Polish pact which dealt with territorial integrity and obligations of neutrality. F. Gaus claimed that in this way the Russians were assuming obligations that significantly exceeded even the ones which the USSR — had it joined the League— would have undertaken in accordance with the Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant. He forewarned the Soviets that "whether [they] do want that or not, these points imply tremendous political consequences"⁷⁹.

Gaus' deputy, R. Meyer, directed his sharp criticism on the second paragraph of Article 2, which would provide a legal basis for Soviet actions in the event of Poland's attack on Germany. Meyer told Alexandrovski that he had instructed his staff to go through all the treaties, which were similar to the envisaged Soviet-Polish agreement and then

"found out that such a formula existed, maybe, only in the Soviet-Lithuanian and one other treaty. In the treaties all other countries have concluded a different formula exists, one which provides for a direct, automatic invalidation of the treaty in cases, which the corresponding articles deal with, of attack by one of the contracting parties against a third party. Why does not the USSR want to apply this formula— the automatic cancellation of the treaty? The condition of denunciation brings M[eyer] to pose another question: who guarantees that the USSR will have wished to abrogate [the Soviet-Polish pact] at the necessary moment? Because right is not obligation [...] The Soviet-French pact is catastrophic in its content. But it does not cause him [Meyer] such trouble precisely because in the real political sense not very much results from it for Germany. Locarno does exist [...] Poland is quite a different matter"⁸⁰.

The *Auswärtige Amt* argued that had Germany become subjected to French attack and Poland been loyal to her duties from a legal point of view, "Poland would no longer be an attacking state but the one fulfilling her obligations as an ally [...] The USSR would not be able to protest or withdraw her neutrality obligations"⁸¹. This was a critical question indeed, and Alexandrovski showed much patience and eloquence appealing to the Germans to "look deeper into the

nature" of the Soviet foreign policy and not to overestimate the significance of "formalities". But Meyer remained unreconciled and kept demanding radical changes in the draft. He added:

"So think Brüning, Hindenburg, Bülow and others. If the grim consequences which he is warning about would be revealed in the future, the USSR might not say that she had not been informed in advance about the attitude of Germany as well as those possible consequences"⁸².

In January 1932, Dirksen in Moscow and his colleagues in Berlin continued to exert pressures on the Russians in the same direction⁸⁴. But all German demarches were in vain. In his memoirs, Herbert von Dirksen claimed that due to consistent diplomatic efforts "our main demand was satisfied unequivocally, namely that the Soviet Union should refrain from guaranteeing, even in the remotest sense of the word, the actual frontiers between Germany and Poland"⁸⁵. The comparison between the original draft presented by the NKID at the starting point of the Soviet-Polish negotiations and the treaty itself does not confirm Dirksen's self-deceptive conclusion. By signing the non-aggression pact with Poland the Soviets recognized her territorial integrity and retained their freedom of actions had Warsaw decided on a preventive war against revisionist Germany. Nor has any convincing evidence been found to prove that, as Dirksen wrote, other German counter-proposals, "to some extent, were accepted"⁸⁶. The records of the Soviet-Polish discussions show that the Foreign Commissar paid little attention to German claims and saw the successful completion of his task as more important than preventing further deterioration of Russian relations with Germany. Motives of Soviet leaders may be complex and even self-contradictory. It is noteworthy, however, that none of the documents available indicates any disagreements with Litvinov's course in the Kremlin⁸⁷.

At the same time, the delays with signing fed Russian suspicions that the Poles were reluctantly following the French lead in normalizing their political relations with the USSR. On February 26, 1932, the Polish Foreign Minister reaffirmed his intention to put the initialled text in force as soon as Soviet treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania were signed. Stomoniakov saw in Zaleski's declaration an additional evidence that "Pilsudski did not and does not want the pact. He entered negotiations under Briand's and Berthelot's pressure. When France had ceased to exert pressure on Poland, Poland no longer displayed interest in them and gave corresponding directives to her loyal vassal — Estonia"⁸⁸.

Neither Stomoniakov and the NKID's First Western Department staff nor the Soviet legation in Warsaw, busy with current affairs (the most significant among them being the issues of a candidate to replace Stanislaw Patek and the nomination of the PAT news agency and the *Gazeta Polska* correspondent to Moscow), were, however, engaged in or able to influence the talks with the

Poles on the non-aggression pact. At this stage, Litvinov continued to handle all matters of political relations with Poland personally⁸⁹.

In May 1932, the Poles offered to act as intermediary to break the Soviet-Rumanian stalemate and, thus, sign the non-aggression pact with Moscow in company with Romania, their only ally in Eastern Europe. On May 23, Krestinski transmitted to Litvinov (who went to Berlin again) Stalin's consent for these proposals. The next day, at the meeting between Litvinov and Zaleski, the ice was finally broken. The Polish Minister, told Litvinov that "Marshal Pilsudski had threatened Rumania with signing a pact with us [the Soviets] independently if she remained stubborn. I [Litvinov] dropped a remark that the actual signing of the pact could be better means of pressure than a threat... Zaleski replied, that the matters would perhaps go this way"⁹⁰. After Soviet-Rumanian talks were resumed in Geneva, the NKID accepted as a basis for discussion the compromise proposals which Zaleski had submitted to the disputing sides⁹¹. Nothing came of the Polish attempt at mediation, but by demonstrating their good will, the Russians were successful in driving a wedge between Warsaw and Bucharest, the latter being supported by France. Pilsudski and his entourage were increasingly annoyed with the Rumanians' dilatory tactic⁹² and alarmed by radical nationalism in Germany⁹³. The Poles were also unwilling to lag too far behind the three Baltic states, which by this time had, as a consequence of 1931 Polish initiative, signed non-aggression treaties with the USSR⁹⁴. When in late June, Litvinov asked the Poles about their plans concerning the non-aggression pact, their reply was positive. On July 5, the Polish Foreign Minister told Litvinov that his government had agreed to sign the treaty immediately, but would not ratify it until a Soviet-Rumanian accord was reached⁹⁵.

On the 25th of July, 1932, Stanislaw Patek and Nikolay Krestinski signed a five-year non-aggression treaty in Moscow. The Soviet efforts were crowned with success. Moscow looked appreciative of the fact that Pilsudski had broken the vicious circle of the tripartite talks and had decided to act independently, while France waited until November 1932 to make up her mind on a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. In his annual report on Polish external policy the Soviet envoy, Antonov-Ovseenko, opined:

"Poland values this result so much that she does not take into account relative unpreparedness of her allies and the Balts. She signs the pact with the Soviet Union despite the fact that Rumania is left aside and the Balts go in disunity. She goes to the signing of the pact, to a certain degree, independently of France"⁹⁶.

Soviet official comments were, however, restrained⁹⁷.

The pact undoubtedly stabilized neighborly relations between the two states. In a more general context, the Soviet-Polish treaty was a necessary prerequisite for

reorienting Russian policy to closer association with the Versailles powers. The immediate gains were doubtful if set against the price Moscow had to pay for the pact. Before bringing the USSR some real guarantees of security in Europe its *rapprochement* with Poland involved considerable risk of finally losing Russian political assets in Germany and eventually facing a united front of capitalist Great Powers.

III

In 1932, Soviet-German relations quickly deteriorated. On the German side there was a new feeling of its increased strength. She was the only European power, which had gained from the economic crisis as far as power balance was concerned, and managed to exploit it in order to achieve foreign policy goals. The Lausanne conference put an end to reparation payments. The domestic policy of the Brüning cabinets in 1930-1932 of "deliberately deepening the crisis" was determined by the hopes that a rigid deflationary approach would rally the Germans against reparations payments and would enable Germany to overcome its economic paralysis before other industrialized nations and outstrip the Eastern European states. The primary aim of the German cabinets since 1930 was to reverse what had remained of the Versailles settlement in a series of stages⁹⁸.

Soviet-Polish *détente* ran counter to Germany's grand designs and undisguised revisionist goals, which had become the *ultimo ratio* of German politics. Ambassador Dirksen and his Counsellor Twardowski believed that German diplomacy should outwardly reconcile itself with the Soviet-Polish pact as a *fait accompli*⁹⁹. The treaty "completely changes Germany's relation" to the USSR, the official of the German Foreign Ministry, Schlesinger, who went to Moscow at the beginning of February, stated in a conversation with Stern, the chief of the NKID's Second Western Department. Schlesinger stressed that he was "speaking not about the Ausamt, but about those circles that call the tune and the broad public"¹⁰⁰. "Never before at the sessions of the preparation committee was the behavior of the Germans as [bad], as at present", a Soviet delegate at the Disarmament conference reported later that month¹⁰¹. A careful observer, Alexandrovski reaffirmed to Krestinski, on the eve of the fall of the Brüning cabinet, that Soviet-German interaction had "evolved to the worst"¹⁰².

The first days of Franz von Papen's chancellorship witnessed expectations (and fears) of a Franco-German agreement. On June 16, 1932, the first day of the Lausanne reparation conference, Papen advanced to the French premier Herriot far-reaching ideas for a Franco-German accord "directed against Commu-

nism, in fact, against Russia". Poland was to become another loser¹⁰³. By July the German proposals were in the newspapers.

International conferences with German, French and British participation were always good occasions for attempts at Russo-Polish *rapprochement*. In 1922, Litvinov's trip to Warsaw had coincided with the meeting at Genoa, and Chicherin had gone to confer with the Poles on the eve of Locarno. The real danger of a Franco-German *rapprochement*, if not alliance, was a factor that induced Pilsudski to permit no delays in signing the non-aggression pact. From the Soviet point of view, a Franco-German *entente* would not only isolate Poland, but could also force her to surrender to German demands. An eventual deal between these three states might have involved German and French support for Poland's receiving territorial compensations in the East. Those concerns led Antonov-Ovse-enko to stress later:

"The tremendous significance of the pacts between us and Poland, France and so on consisted in the fact, that by this diplomatic step we, in a suit of two sides, strengthened the weakest, prepared to a concession, to a concession, leading to an anti-Soviet agreement. We were in time to fortify Poland in her resistance to Germany"¹⁰⁴.

Other scenarios also could not be excluded from consideration in Moscow. The non-aggression pact with the USSR had improved Poland's chances for resisting Germany and, thus, increased the likelihood that a settlement of their contradictions would be at the expense of the Soviet interests. During the second half of 1932, the Soviets remained suspicious of Pilsudski's ulterior motives and "the complete unanimity with which 'public opinion' in Poland greeted the conclusion of the pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union"¹⁰⁵. The Russians feared that Warsaw would exploit the improvement of its bargaining position *vis-à-vis* Germany to reach a political and territorial compromise with her. As the Soviet envoy to Warsaw explained, whatever the true motives of the ruling élite had been, in general,

"the tactical manoeuvre of interventionist circles did not at all exclude in principle a temporary reconciliation, even imitation of a *rapprochement* with the Soviets. It might facilitate Poland's agreement with Germany [...] Preparation for an interventionist front might, from the point of view of French and Polish imperialists, include the temporary manifestation of intimacy with the Sov[iet] Union. The normalization of Poland's relation with the Sov[iet] Union does not preclude, but [rather] facilitates Poland's collusion with Germany, exactly at the expense of the Sov[iet] Union. Such is the thinking of French and other supporters of anti-Soviet intervention, such is it — in the public pronouncements of the raging Polish interventionists — Mackiewicz and others ('Slowo', 'Bunt Mlodych' etc)"¹⁰⁶.

Moscow was also aware that, given French suspicions about Germany, the latter was likely to invite Poland to join an anti-Soviet combination. The Communist press wrote about Papen's plans to reach a Franco-German-Polish accord which would lead to a revision of the German eastern borders¹⁰⁷. A readjustment of the Polish-German frontiers would inevitably have meant some territorial compensation to Poland at the expense of Lithuania or the USSR.

The first scenario was based on the idea of transferring the Polish Corridor to Germany and granting Poland an outlet to the Baltic sea through Lithuanian territory. Such a plan had been rumored since the mid-20s and even in 1933 as prominent a German diplomat as Rudolf Nadolny believed that "the assignment to Poland [of] a bank of Lithuanian territory leading up to Memel" was a "feasible solution"¹⁰⁸. It was a strong reason for the Soviets to monitor closely Lithuanian relations with Poland and Germany during 1932. Any sign of Kaunas entering "the Polish orbit" caused "the Russian agents to busy themselves in an effort to counteract it"¹⁰⁹.

Another possibility for opening a tripartite *entente* was a German collaboration in splitting the Ukraine off from the USSR and establishing it as a Polish protectorate in return for territorial concessions on the part of Warsaw. Konstantin von Neurath, the new German Foreign Minister, and his State Secretary were sceptical about multinational schemes of Papen and of the Mayrisch Committee of French and German industrialists and did not believe the necessary Eastern revision could be achieved in cooperation with France¹¹⁰. They seem to have been more sympathetic to Schleicher's dual strategy of dealing simultaneously with France and the USSR. It was probably with the aim of putting pressure on Moscow to bring her to her senses that the *Auswärtige Amt* had revived the Ukrainian issue in Russo-German relations. In July 1932, the NKID for the first time in several years showed uneasiness about the Ukrainian agitation in German political circles and connections between the Nazi and the anti-Soviet Ukrainian organizations, UVO and UNDO¹¹¹. In early August, the chief of the Russian section of the German Foreign Ministry departed for Moscow through the Ukraine. "In circles close to the Government Herr von Tippelskirch's trip was regarded as a hint to the Soviet Government, that in case the Russo-Polish Non-Aggression Pact indicated a change in Russia's attitude toward Germany, Germany on her part would take more than objective interest in the independence of the Ukraine"¹¹².

As the correspondence of the First Western Department of the Narkomindel with the Legation in Warsaw suggest, the Soviets thought the exacerbation of tensions between Poland and Germany¹¹³ could turn out to be merely the result of each side's intention to fortify its position before striking a bargain. They were determined not to be caught flat-footed and to avert such a danger before it materialized. The German Foreign Ministry intended to exploit Soviet suspicions either to hinder the USSR's drive to Versailles powers or even to regain its

influence in Moscow. On August 8, in response to inquiries by Soviet *chargé d'affaires* Boris Podolski, the German embassy's first secretary in Warsaw, von Ekkert, revealed a story about top secret Polish-German negotiations concerning radical political and territorial settlement. According to Ekkert, the negotiations had begun just after the closure in Lausanne¹¹⁴. Although the chief of the Second Western Department David Stern did not like the idea, Litvinov and Krestinski came to an agreement that they should react to this news through foreign press channels. N. Raivid and K. Oumanski (the heads of the First Western and Press departments, respectively) drafted a communication on the lines of Podolski's dispatch. After Litvinov's approval, the text was forwarded to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin to be transmitted to Friedrich R. Kuh. A representative of the *United Press*, F. Kuh maintained intimate relations with the Soviets foreign agencies, while his contacts in German government circles "were better than those of any other correspondent"¹¹⁵. He loyally wired the document, as if it had been his own dispatch, to American newspapers, which broke the story in early September¹¹⁶. The text, which closely followed von Ekkert's information, reveals some of the motives behind the German and the Soviet policy in Central Europe:

“[...] The Polish participants of these negotiations raised the question about the necessity of serious improvement of the political atmosphere existing between Poland and Germany. The German participants displayed their readiness, but stated that the decisive factor in this regard might be liquidation of the Corridor issue by some compensation from the German side [...] ...Germany manifested her preparedness, in order to facilitate Poland's decision on the Corridor issue, to guarantee formally for a certain period of time Germany's refusal to raise the question of Upper Silesia. The Polish representatives, belonging to the Marshal's closest entourage, expressed their sympathy to the plan of returning the Corridor to Germany on condition of certain solid compensations, which should not be limited to the issue of Upper Silesia, but at the same time they stated melancholically that at the present time, due to internal policy considerations, no Polish Government ...could dare to undertake such a step. Thus, these negotiations at the present stage have not lead to decisive shifts in relations between Poland and Germany yet. Neither side regarded the negotiations as having been completed¹¹⁷.

Whether or not Litvinov believed the story (as his subordinates seemed to do), no one in Moscow could claim in these weeks that such ideas were completely alien to the Polish ruling circles. The Russians were interested in remaining on the best possible terms with Germany and to distract them from new attempts at an anti-Soviet bloc. As he had done earlier, Litvinov missed no chance to persuade German political figures that Moscow had not yet made up her mind on whether to promote its political ties with anti-revisionist states and that

good relations between the USSR and Germany might still be preserved. Among the contacts the Soviets had cultivated for many years was Count von Reventlov, in the early 30s a deputy to the Reichstag and NSDAP representative in its commission on foreign policy¹¹⁸. Reventlov also published the *Reichswart* weekly, widely read in nationalistic quarters. "In one of its latest issues," Boris Vinogradov, the Counsellor of the Berlin Embassy wrote, Reventlov included an article on the Soviet-Polish pact in which "some sound thoughts, taken from [his] talks with M.M.[Litvinov] and myself, are stated. Thus, R.[eventlov] writes that the evolution of Soviet-Polish relations in this or that direction depends on the German foreign policy itself and that as before Germany must bolster her relations with the USSR and safeguard herself against any experiments in this matter"¹¹⁹.

Those assurances and warnings, as well as Moscow's reluctance during the most part of 1932 to demonstrate the new warmth in the Soviet-Polish relations to the outside¹²⁰, were elements of the diplomatic games which could serve several purposes.

The main purpose seems to have been creating favorable conditions for Soviet-Polish *rapprochement*. After signing the non-aggression pact the Politburo (probably, on August 1) instructed government agencies, including OGPU, not to generate "petty incidents with the Poles" and to loosen their surveillance over the Polish diplomats and the military in Moscow¹²¹. Moscow wished to speed up the process of ratification of the Soviet-Polish pact. The NKID's instruction "not to hasten with ratification of the pact", Stomoniakov explained to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Warsaw, intended to stress that the only result of raising the issue before the Foreign Ministry would be a Polish counter-proposal to the Russians to ratify the pact first. It would be much better, Stomoniakov pointed out, to force the Poles to take the initiative in this matter by displaying reserve¹²².

Maintaining decent relations with Germany was intended to protect Moscow against the possible reversal of the Polish policy. At this stage, Moscow was reluctant to reappraise its views on Pilsudski's strategy as aimed at preparing an aggressive anti-Soviet bloc and saw little evidence that his 1919-1920 program for federation with the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania had been abandoned for good. Optimistic conclusions like the ones Antonov-Ovseenko presented in his reports were considered at least premature in the Narkomindel. In mid-October the Member of the NKID's Collegium Boris Stomoniakov wrote to the polpred: "The shift in the policy of the Pol[ish] gov[ernment] toward a more peace-loving policy in regard to the USSR, about which you inform [the NKID] and news come from different sides, is up to now, it seems, still rather psychological in its character"¹²³.

In the fall of 1932 Antonov-Ovseenko's view that the Poles were unlikely to make any substantive concessions to Germany in their bid to secure bilateral

settlement or an 'eastern Locarno' and that any Polish-German accord would hardly be more than a "political moratorium", with each side preparing for war against the other, was gaining additional weight in Moscow¹²⁴. In November 1932, the chief of the Foreign Section of *Izvestia*, Stefan Raevski, was sent to Poland¹²⁵. He was obviously charged with sounding out prominent political persons of the ruling camp¹²⁶ and met, among others, the former minister and Pilsudski's close collaborator, Ignacy Matuszewski. Earlier that year, Matuszewski and Miedziński, the co-editors of the semi-official *Gazeta Polska*, had been entrusted by the Marshal with the task of establishing confidential contacts with the Soviet Legation¹²⁷. The results of the Raevski's explorative mission were encouraging. From his Warsaw conversations, he had gained the impression of "the Pol[ish] Gov[ernment]'s shift to a peaceloving policy towards us"¹²⁸.

As if to demonstrate that the era of mutual tensions was over, the Polish Foreign Ministry forwarded to Moscow an official request inquiring whether it would accept Juliusz Lukasiewicz, a forty-year-old career diplomat, as the new Polish Minister to the USSR. The heads of Narkomindel were critical of Stanislaw Patek political abilities and professional insight, but they were not happy with the views Lukasiewicz reportedly expressed about the Soviet system. For half a year, the Soviet diplomats in Warsaw had repeatedly alluded to the Poles that this candidate would be unacceptable to the Soviet Government. Once the request was received, however, the Soviet authorities promptly communicated their consent, as Stomoniakov explained in his letter to Antonov-Ovseenko, "in order to, at least, establish in advance relations with him [Lukasiewicz] as good as possible"¹²⁹. This episode is indicative of the mood, which seemed to prevail in the Kremlin and the NKID quarters at the end of 1932. The question whether new friendly relations with Poland might be of strategic or purely tactical importance for the USSR was still open to debates, but the most immediate Soviet interests obviously coincided with those of Poland and the shift in her policy toward a *détente* with Russia was valued in Moscow.

No difficulties arose in the course of the Russian-Polish negotiations about a convention which was to provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the absence of an arbitration agreement. On November 23, 1932, the conciliation convention serving this purpose (and outlined in the fourth article of the non-aggression pact), was signed by Litvinov and Patek. Four days later, both agreements were ratified by the Polish President and the All-Union Executive Committee of the USSR. Two-year Soviet efforts were completed with the Soviet-French non-aggression accord, signed in Paris on November 29. With the exchange of ratification instruments on December 23, the Soviet-Polish pact came into force.

Both sides expressed their satisfaction with this achievement. The Soviet political gains were considerable: a splitting of the Polish-Rumanian bloc, a loos-

ening of French-Polish ties and, to some extent, a lessening of Polish influence in the Baltic region. The non-aggression pact with Poland increased security on the western frontiers. A resulting Soviet-Polish *détente* could develop into real political cooperation against Germany's attack on the status-quo. Seeming unanimity in Moscow's approach to Poland during 1932 reflected growing anxiety over the developments underway in Europe and East Asia. These preoccupations with changing balance of power led the Head of the International Information Bureau of the VKP(b) Central Committee, C. Radek, to acknowledge later:

"La situation actuelle n'est pas née d'avènement d'Hitler. Elle résulte de la présence de soixante-dix millions d'Allemands industriels et entrepreneurs, auxquels un contrepoids est indispensable dans la politique européenne"¹³⁰.

Behind this consensus probably lay divergent views on the Soviet strategy. The question, remained, which remedy to the European anxiety could better serve Soviet long-term interests. Deputy Commissar Krestinski, more optimistic than other senior officials of the Narkomindel about the chances for maintaining Rapallo, was certainly not the only statesman inclined to regard the Soviet-Polish detente as a possible lever in future talks with Germany and as a means of forcing her to seek Russian friendship¹³¹.

Whatever were the calculations or miscalculations of the Soviet leaders, the 1932 decisions had strong repercussions for Russia's policy. The Soviet-Polish pact, with its ominous implications for German revisionist goals in the east as well as in the west, decisively reduced the possibility of a revival of the Rapallo partnership. In acrimonious discussions between leading Soviet and German diplomats in 1933-1934, there was little disagreement that by the fall of 1932 the Rapallo epoch had come to an end. Litvinov attributed this fact to Papen's anti-Soviet plans. The Germans maintained a more plausible explanation, claiming it had been the Soviet-Polish *rapprochement* that caused rapid deterioration of the cooperative relations between the USSR and Germany¹³¹. In January 1934, David Stern recorded a strong-worded statement by Twardowski, the German Embassy's Counsellor and a veteran of Rapallo,

"There is no doubt, T.[wardovski] said, that on the day the [Soviet-Polish] pact had been signed, Rapallo was buried because, in fact, the substance of the Rapallo policy was the statement Chicherin made to Brockdorf-Rantzau that in case of Germany's conflict with Poland no less than 15 Polish divisions would be drawn to Soviet borders. The Soviet-Polish pact had been signed long before the Nazis came to power"¹³³.

Notes to chapter 1

1. A. Clayton. *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*. Athens, 1986.
2. M. M. Lee, W. Michalka. *German foreign policy 1917-1933: Continuity or Break?* Leamington Spa, 1987, 123.
3. For interpretations of the Rapallo agreements, see J. Hiden. *Germany and Europe 1919-1939. 2nd ed.* L., N. Y., 1993, 114-117. These divergences of views among historians seem to mirror the 1920s debates within the Narkomindel on the proper meaning of Rapallo for Soviet foreign policy in the long run. While G. Chicherin, L. Karakhan, N. Krestinski regarded this accord with Germany as a keystone of a new Soviet strategy, their opponents, M. Litvinov and A. Ioffe viewed Rapallo merely as a precedent for achieving a settlement with other Great Powers (V. V. Sokolov. "Ia ne priznaiu sebja vinovnym. Polpred SSSR v Germanii Nikolai Krestiskii," in V. V. Popov (ed.) *Arkhivy otkryvaiut tainy...* Moscow, 1991, 212. John Hiden himself asserts that "the path of German-Soviet 'partnership' was no smoother after Rapallo than before" (*Op. cit.*, 117).
4. A. A. Akhtamzian. "Voennoie sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii v 1920-1933 gg. (po novym materialam)", *Novaia i noveishaia istoria*, 1990, No 5, 14-15. For evidencies of disagreements concerning Soviet relations with Germany between G. Chicherin and the Politburo in 1926-27, see Yu. L. Diakov, T. S. Bushueva [eds.]. *Fashistskii mekh kovalsia v SSSR. Krasnaya armia i reikhsver. Tainoe sotrudnichestvo 1922-1933. Neizvestnye dokumenty*. Moscow, 1992, 70-71. See also excerpts from Chicherin letters to Stalin and Rykov in 1929 (V. V. Sokolov. "Neizvestnyi G. V. Chicherin. Iz rassekrechennykh arkhivov MID," *Novaia i noveishaia istoria*, 1994, No 2, 13-15) and E. Belevich, V. Sokolov. "Narkomindel Georgiy Chicherin, *Mezh-dunarodnaia zhizn*, 1991, No 2, 106.
5. S. Marks. *The Illusion of Peace: International relations in Europe 1918-1933*. London and Basingstoke, 1976, 108; J. Krasuski. *Stosunki polsko-nie-miecki, 1919-1932*. Poznań, 1975, 345.
6. H. L. Dyck. *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability*. L., 1966, 152.
7. L. Fisher. *The Soviets in World Affairs. A History of the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World. 1917-1929*. Vol. 2. Princeton, NJ, 1951, 827. Leading Soviet diplomats, including Chicherin, Litvinov and Rakovski, had read the book before it appeared in 1930. They must have agreed with Fisher's illustration to this formula: "If France became weaker than Germany there may be a readjustment of Soviet sympathies" (*ibid*).

An author of scrupulous study of the Soviet Foreign Office in the 20s, Teddy J. Uldricks, concludes that "the Soviet approach to the great powers, when stripped of its Marxist-Leninist jargon, was the traditional balance of powers policy" ("Stalin and Nazi Germany", *Slavic Review*, vol. 36, No 4 (Dec. 1977), 599. The problem, however, is that as long as the Communist beliefs remained more than mere rhetoric (as it had been until

the old Bolshevik élite evaporated in the mid-30s), one could hardly eliminate them from the political body. During the years in question, the Marxist-Leninist approach was still a tool for actual analysis, affected the outlook of those who made and executed foreign policy decisions and served more purposes than public relations (not too bad, one may argue). Chicherin's formula fortuitously embodies both lines, intertwined in the Soviet external policy. It may also serve as a reminder of the significance of the Tolstoy tradition for conversion of Chicherin, Litvinov and some of their colleagues to Social Democracy at the turn of the century.

Another major specific feature of the Soviet balance of power policy, the emphasis it put on exploiting antagonisms which beset relations between imperialist states, could be considered a consequence of the principle of "supporting the feeble" because until the 30s the Bolsheviks saw their country as such. This assumption might also explain a "coincidence" between a realignment of the Soviet foreign policy and the completion of the first Five-Year Plan. See also R. G. Wesson. *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*. Homewood, Illi., 1969, 111.

8. N. Kornev. "Krizis Rapallo?", *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, 1930, No 3, 11.

9. Ibid, 16. Simultaneously an official Soviet organ called for normalization in the Soviet-Polish relations (*Izvestia*, 19. 3. 1930; see also J. Karski. *The Great Powers and Poland 1919-1945: From Versailles to Yalta*. N. Y., 1985, 136).

10-11. *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, 1930, No 3, 17-18. Cf. leader in *Izvestia*, 13. 6. 1930.

12. See also A. Skrzypek. "Niemcy w polityce Związku Radzieckiego w latach dwudziestych XX wieku", *Niemcy w polityce międzynarodowej 1919-1939. T. 1. Era Stresemiana*. Poznań, 1990, 273.

13. H. L. Dyck. *Op. cit.*, 187-188.

14. W. Jedrzejewicz (ed.). *Diplomat in Berlin 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland*. N. Y., 1968, 20.

15. The predominantly Ukrainian population of the Eastern Galicia, which never belonged to the Russian empire, after 1918 favored a reunification with the Ukrainian Republic.

16. For figures from the Austrian, German and Polish censuses, see S. Horak. *Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-1939: A Case Study*. N. Y., 1961; A. Cienciala. *Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939. A Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe*. L., Toronto, 1968, 3-4.

17. P. S. Wandycz. "The Treaty of Riga: Its Significance for Interwar Polish Foreign Policy", in T. V. Gromada (ed.). *Essays on Polish Foreign Policy 1918-1939*. N. Y., 1970, 33.

18. Z. Gasiorowski. "The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924", *Journal of Modern History*, vol. XXX, No 2 (June 1958), 100, 103.

The Western studies based on German diplomatic and military records suggest that Nikolay Krestinski in his letter to Khinchuk in May 1933 correctly summed up the

Soviet position in numerous exchanges between Berlin and Moscow during the Weimar era as follows:

"We were always cautious when the German side started speaking about a common armed struggle, say, against Poles. We did not object when the Germans spoke about [our] common foe, our military men did the same [? sic]. Thus, we did not destroy the Germans' hopes that in case of their collision with Poland they would meet this or that support on our part, but never were there any positive statements from our side which would have given them the right to rely on our active assistance." (AVP RF: 082, inv. 16, folder 71, f. 1, pp. 194-193).

19. The issue of a Russo-Polish non-aggression treaty was first raised by Józef Piłsudski in the conversation with Maxim Litvinov, the then Deputy Foreign Commissar, in April 1922 (J. Cisek. *Kalendarium działalności Józefa Piłsudskiego. Uzupełnienia do "Kroniki życia Józefa Piłsudskiego 1867-1935"*. N. Y., 1992, 41.

20. J. Korbel. *Poland Between East and West. Soviet-German Diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933*. Princeton, NJ, 1963, 173-174.

21. S. Stanisławska. "Soviet Policy Toward Poland, 1926-1939", in A. Kor-czyński, T. Świątochowski (eds.). *Poland Between Germany and Russia: The Theory of Two Enemies*. N. Y., 1975, 31. For an often neglected evidence of Piłsudski's efforts for a *détente* with Russia in 1927, see M. Sokolnicki. "Polityka Piłsudskiego a Turcja", *Niepodległość*, t. 6. L., 1958, 18-19.

22. For Rykov's statement of 1927, see J. Korbel. *Op. cit.*, 209; for Chicherin's vivid explanation of Soviet fears of a Polish-Baltic coalition to the Polish envoy in 1926, see DiM: 4, 464-466, 468.

23. A. N. Tarulis. *Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918-1940*. Notre Dame (Indiana), 1959, 62-64; J. Korbel. *Op. cit.*, ch. 10. For Lithuanian views on Vilnius (Wilno) problem, see B. Kaslas. *The USSR-German Aggression against Lithuania*. N. Y., 1973.

24. This line put the Communist Parties of Western Ukraine and of Western Byelorussia in an embarrassing position and caused endless ideological debates among its leaders and the Polish-Baltic *Ländersecretariat* of the Komintern since the Communist credo demanded fighting first of all bourgeois nationalism of one's own nation.

25. In an extensive G-2 report on the Ukrainian question the American military *attaché* in Poland referred to his recent conversation with the Chief of the Second Bureau of the General Staff, who

"explained that the Polish Government, while it respected the treaties with the present Soviet government and did not carry on agitation in or out the Soviet territory for a separate Ukraine, they did have sympathy, naturally, for the movement and kept it in mind in their dealings with the Ukrainian minority in Poland. He said they had been working for an understanding with responsible representatives of the Ukrainian minority and in the early summer [of 1930] they had reached the basis for such an understanding which promised to eliminate the possibility of important dangerous

agitation from the outside sources" (E. Yeager's report, Warsaw, Oct. 7, 1930, WDNA: 2657-DD-548/3).

At the same time, Warsaw seemed to share Soviet apprehensions that the Ukrainian national movement might be used by a Great Power for dealing a blow at the USSR. In the end of 1931 the American embassy gathered that "some concern is felt by the [Polish] Government lest British interest in Ukrainian questions reflect less the initiative of "Geneva minded" members of the Labor party than national policy. It is surmised that Great Britain wishes a Ukrainian 'Piedmont' in Poland as *point d'appui* for an eventual separatist movement in the USSR" (J. N. Willys to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Oct. 21, 1931, SDNA: 860c. 01/440).

26. DVP: 7, 425. For notes of the Polish legation in Moscow to the NKID, August 23 and September 16, 1924, and the Soviet replies to them, see DiM: 4, Nos 228, 233, 231, 234. For earlier exchanges on the Eastern Galician problem, see P. N. Olshanski. *Rizhskiy dogovor i razvitie sovetsko-pol'skikh otnoshenii 1921-1924*. Moscow, 1974, 215, 225-227.

27. Petrushevich, a prominent Galician leader in exile, who fought for the reunification of Ukrainian lands within the USSR, in a conversation with a counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in September 1932 accused Moscow and Kharkov of sacrificing the Ukrainians to the aim of maintaining normal relations with the Polish occupants (AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 8, pp. 171-168). See also the Politburo decision of June 3, 1932, which rejected a proposal for sending food aid to the Carpathian Ukraine (Appendix. 2).

28. H. D. Phillips. *Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov*. Boulder, Colo., 1992, 102.

29. According to L. Fisher (*Op. cit.*, 782), even before the USSR joined the Kellogg pact on the abolition of war in August 1928, Litvinov saw in this treaty "an opportunity to force Poland into a separate peace agreement with Moscow. This had been one of his arguments when the question of Soviet adhesion to the Kellogg Pact was still being debated in inner Bolshevik circles". See also a report of the Polish mission in Moscow to the MSZ, January 15, 1929 (St. Lopatniuk (ed.). "Protocol Moskiewski (9 luty 1929)", *Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy*. T. 4. Warszawa, 1969, No 9).

30. S. Marks. *Op. cit.*, 112-113. The author offers a reappraisal of the traditional views on the interdependence between the economic depression and the Nazi's advance after 1930.

31. *Izvestia*, 22. 7. 1930; Gordon to the Secretary of State, Berlin, Sept. 30, 1930, SDNA 861. 002/112.

32. L. Fisher. *The Greatest Challenge*. N. Y., 1946, 281; T. H. von Laue. "Soviet diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930", in G. A. Craig, F. Gilbert (eds.). *The Diplomats 1919-1939*. Princeton, NJ, 1953, 278.

33. J. Beck. *Op. cit.*, 1.

34. I. V. Mikhutina. "Sovetsko-pol'skii pakt o nenapadenii i vneshnia politika Pol'shi v 1931-1932 gg.", in I. I. Kostiusenko *et al.* (eds.). *Sovetsko-polskie otnoshenia, 1918-1945*. Moscow, 1974, 134.
35. The appointment of Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko to the post in Warsaw in the end of 1929 was seen there as a good sign. The Assistant Chief of the Eastern Division of the MSZ remarked upon his arrival that the attitude of Antonov-Ovseenko "has always been and is extremely friendly to Poland" (Ph. L. Cable to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, March 3, 1930 (Memorandum of interview with E. Raczynski, March 1), SDNA: 760c. 61/616).
36. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 17, folder 164, f. 3, 144-145.
37. DiM: 5, 473. On the controversy concerning the initiative for Soviet-Polish discussions at the end of 1930 see I. V. Mikhutina. *Op. cit.*, 135-136; P. S. Wandycz. *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances 1926-1936: Franco-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland*. Princeton, 1987, 207. In fact Stalin recognized that the initiative and the main drive were on the Soviet side when he told Ludwig: "As soon as the Poles declared that they were ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact with us we naturally agreed and opened negotiations" (I. V. Stalin. *Works*. Moscow, 1954. T. 13, 119). See also DDF: 10, 75-76.
38. J. N. Willys to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Aug. 26, 1931, SDNA: 760c. 6111/13.
39. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 17, folder 164, f. 3, p. 145. See also DiM: 5, 473-475; DVP: 14, 51; I. V. Mikhutina. *Op. cit.*, 137-138.
40. McCeney Werlich to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, March 29, 1931, SDNA: 760c. 61/636.
41. F. M. Sackett to the Secretary of State, Berlin, Sept. 2, 1931, SDNA: 751. 6111/7.
42. The details of these exchanges are not known. Their existence is proved by the *Bemerkungen* of April 4, 1931 (see below).
43. P. S. Wandycz. *August Zaleski, Minister Spraw Zagranicznych RP w świetle wspomnień i dokumentów*. Paris, 1980, 96-97; I. V. Mikhutina. *Op. cit.*, 134; J. N. Willys to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Aug. 26, 1931, SDNA: 760c. 6111/13).
44. Edge to the Secretary of State, Paris, June 17, 1931, SDNA 462. 00 R 296/3986 Section 4.
45. H. D. Phillips *Op. cit.*, 116-117.
46. DVP: 14, 351, 360. The Note of the Political Direction of the MAE, March 28, 1935, reminded the minister that "in January 1931, M. Briand authorized M. Berthelot to examine with M. Dovgalevsky the possibilities for concluding such [non-aggression] pact[s] with France and in particular with Poland and Rumania" (DDF: 10, 76).
47. See note 40.

48. For conflicting reports on this issue, see H. L. Dyck. *Op. cit.*, 239; P. S. Wandycz. *Op. cit.*, 208-209.

49. DiM: 5, 490-492.

50. H. L. Dyck. *Op. cit.*, 240-242; P. S. Wandycz. *Op. cit.*, 209 (note 85). On August 19, the *New York Herald Tribune* reported, after the *United Press* from London, about the "conclusion" of the Franco-Soviet pact, which the French government decided to keep in secret (DBFP: 7, 218; W. E. Scott. *Alliance against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact*. Durham, NC, 1962, 13). Probably the NKID was behind this leakage. On its connections with F. Kuh, the *UP* correspondent in Europe, see below.

51. DiM: 5, 497.

52. W. E. Scott. *Op. cit.*, 17; J. N. Willys to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Aug. 26, 1931, SDNA: 760c. 6111/13.

53. J. Korbel. *Op. cit.*, 193-195.

54. AVP RF: 05, inv. 12, folder 86, f. 67.

55. J. Korbel. *Op. cit.*, 207, 221.

56. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 7, p. 17; A. Skrzypek. "Polsko-radziecki pakt o nieagresji z 1932 r.", *Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały*. T. 13. Warszawa, 1976, 22-23. The American ambassador in Berlin noted that "on the whole, German press reaction to the possibility of a Russo-Polish treaty of Neutrality was not unfavorable. Schlesinger, however, saw Franco-Polish-Soviet negotiations as an indication of "the end of the French policy of unfriendliness towards Soviet Russia, and the resumption of Franco-Russian relations as they were before the war, that is placing Germany between the Russian bear and the French bayonet" (F. M. Sackett to the Secretary of State, Berlin, Sept 2, 1931, SDNA: 751. 6111/7).

57. DVP: 14, 717. This statement probably reflected the Politburo decision (see the *Gazeta Polska* (Aug. 28, 1931) report about its postponement). On the Soviet press comments, see I. V. Mikhutina. *Op. cit.*, 142-144.

58. Ibid, 146-148; M. Leczyk. *Op. cit.*, 285-287; P. S. Wandycz. *August Zaleski*, 97.

59. See, for example, speculations of the Polish ambassador to the United States (Memorandum of the conversation between T. Filipowicz and H. L. Stimson, SDNA: 760c. 6111/19)

A short-lived underground Communist journal *Żołnierz Rewolucji* in the end of 1931 responded to this problem by highlighting the significance of Poland's position:

"From whence comes the chief menace of an attack on the USSR? From the West or from the East? The enormous territories in the East (Asia), deserts and mountains, the remoteness of the base of attack, such as, for example, Manchuria and northwest India, from the nations most hostile to the USSR (with the exception of Japan) as well as from important centers at home, do not afford a possibility that the main attack could be made on the USSR from the East. The main blow would probably be struck in

Europe. There can be three bases for an attack in Europe: 1) the Baltic Sea and its coast; 2) Poland and Rumania, and 3) the Black Sea and its coast. It is evident that in the event of an attack against the USSR, all three bases will be made use of just as Manchuria and India can and will be used for an attack on certain territories of the USSR. However, in this case we must examine which of these three bases will constitute the most dangerous one as providing greatest opportunities for imperialists for the following reasons:

1) affording the shortest route to the vital centers of the USSR; 2) having the greatest reserve of population; 3) being located in closest proximity to the chief capitalist powers conducting a war against the USSR. We see that all the three bases fulfill the first and third conditions, while Poland fulfills all of them" (S. "Zagadnienia obrony Związku Radzieckiego ze strony wojskowo strategicznej", *Żołnierz Rewolucji*. No 2. Październik 1931 [the date is probably false; judging by the content of the issue it appeared later that year].

J. Bach from the Public Security Section of the Polish Interior Ministry told the US Ambassador that the article had been "so revealing of Soviet plans" that the Centre "immediately suspended publication of the periodical and recalled to Moscow for disciplinary action three of four members of the editorial staff". The Polish security official thought the author of this article was Soviet General Bortnovski, who operated from Berlin prior to 1933 (J. Cudahy to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Sept. 25, 1933, SDNA: 861. 20/330; *ibid*, Apr. 10, 1934, SDNA: 861. 20/348).

60. Evidence to support the view that in early 1930s the threat from Japan took priority are presented by J. Haslam (*Op. cit.*, chapters 7 and 8). He points out that from the beginning of the crisis the Russians "embarked upon a seemingly endless series of concessions towards Japan" and that "this conciliatory line aroused strong opposition in Moscow" (*Ibid*, 81). How strong the opposition to appeasement was in military and party circles remains a riddle. The documents quoted by H. Phillips and his comments suggest that although the Foreign Commissar was worried about long-range effects of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, "there was nothing immediate in this fear". This author concludes with the supposition that "by early 1933 much more serious problems confronted the Soviet Union in Europe", than in the East Asia (*Op. cit.*, 118-119). It seems, in this context "1932" could easily be exchanged for "1933".

61. A. Skrzypek. *Op. cit.*, 22-23.

62. For a general outline of the negotiations in the late November 1931 — January 1932, see M. Leczyk. *Op. cit.*, 287-292.

63. DiM: 5, 118, 509, 522; L. Shapiro (ed.). *Soviet Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements, Conventions, etc., Concluded between the Soviet Union and Foreign Powers*. Vol. 2. 1929-1939. Washington, D. C., 1955, No 379. The Soviet-Polish pact gave "more concrete definition of the terms 'aggressor' and 'neutrality' than those contained in the Kellogg Pact" (Memorandum on the Pacts of Non-Aggression negotiated by the USSR, 1931-1932, Dec. 30, 1932, FO 371/17234 (paragraph 36)). In

all other Soviet pacts, concluded in 1932, definitions of aggression were less strict (See L. Shapiro (ed.). *Op. cit.*, Nos 365, 366, 373, 386).

64. *Ibid.* From the Soviet point of view neutrality meant "far less than giving no assistance to third parties" (DVP: 18, 341).

65. DiM: 5, 515.

66. *Ibid.*, 522, 534.

67. N. J. Kopanski, I. E. Levit *Sovetsko-rumynskie otnoshenia. 1929-1934.* Moscow, 1974, 89.

68. P. S. Wandycz. *The Twilight*, 211. For Zaleski's statement in London, December 1931, on the necessity of a genuine rapprochement with the Soviets, see M. Nowak-Kielbikova. *Polska-Wielka Britania w dobie zabiegów o zbiorowe bezpieczeństwo w Europie 1923-1937.* Warszawa, 1989, 301.

69. DiM: 5, 522.

70. The issue was not submitted for a formal approval of the Politburo. Probably the decision was taken by Stalin after discussing these matters in the inner circle.

71. R. D. Skinner to the Secretary of State, Riga, Febr. 5, 1932, SDNA: 761. 7111/11.

72. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, pile 68, f. 7, p. 1.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

74. Dirksen's account of his conversation with Litvinov in November 1931, as related by J. Karsky (*Op. cit.*, 137-138) suggests that the Soviet document in question had been drafted by this time.

75. AVP RF: 05, inv. 12, folder 86, f. 67, p. 17.

76. I. V. Stalin. *Op. cit.*, 119.

77. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 7, p. 23.

78. J. N. Wiley to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Dec. 4, 1931 SDNA: 760c. 6111/18.

79. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 7, p. 1.

80. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-20.

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-11; *ibid.*, folder 67, f. 3, pp. 11, 23; J. Karsky. *Op. cit.*, 137.

85. H. von Dirksen. *Moscow, Tokio, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy.* Norman (Oklahoma), 1952, 106. Cf. R. C. Tucker. "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy", *Slavic Review*, vol. 36, 1977, 580.

German diplomats, for the very reason that the Soviet-Polish pact diminished the chances of early execution of the German revisionist program, displayed before their colleagues aloofness toward the shift in Moscow's policy: "In reply to the discreet feeler as to the

attitude of the *Wilhelmstrasse* in respect of the proposed Franco-Soviet and Polish-Soviet non-aggression pacts, Herr von Moltke vigorously declared that the German Government was entirely disinterested" (J. C. Wiley to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, Nov. 23, 1931, SDNA: 760c. 6111/20).

86. *Ibid*, 105.

87. See German records of conversations the Peoples' Commissar for War, K. Voroshilov, held with General Adam of the Reichswehr (mid-October) and Dirksen (mid-December 1931). When set against Voroshilov's letter to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, dated March 12, 1932, these documents show that Soviet War Office largely supported the NKID's line (Yu. L. Dia-kov, T. S. Bushueva. *Op. cit.*, 121, 128-129, 132).

88. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 16, folder 160, f. 8, p. 11.

89. Cf. H. D. Phillips. *Op. cit.*, 118.

90. DVP: 15, 329-330.

91. For details, see A. Skrzypek. *Op. cit.*, 26-27, 29.

92. See, for example, reports on Pilsudski's visit to Bucharest in May 1932 (Ch. S. Wilson to the Secretary of State, Bucharest, May 3 and May 16, 1932, SDNA: 761. 7111/15, 16).

93. The American Embassy communicated to Washington views of a "well informed Polish official" that

"Poland could at present defend herself against Germany, but that given one more year and this would not be the case. On the other hand he expressed the opinion that Schleicher was the brains of the present [Papen's] Government in Germany and that he could control and use the Hitlerites. He expressed the opinion that Schleicher would use every means to consolidate German relations with the Soviets, Italy and Turkey to the detriment of Poland, and he felt that as Poland could not expect much from France, its duty was to cultivate Soviet Russia to offset, if possible, the strong influence Germany already had there" (Flack to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, June 8, 1932, SDNA: 760c. 61/649).

94. Latvia and Estonia signed its pacts with Russia on February 5 and May 4 respectively. The Soviet-Finnish pact was ratified by the President on July 7, 1932. "It appears that the Russians have successfully used the promise of the reestablishment of commercial relations with Finland after the ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact to obtain ratification" (Brodie to the Secretary of State, Helsingfors, July 8, 1932, SDNA: 760d. 6111/27). See also I. V. Mikhutina. *Op. cit.*, 157.

95. DVP: 15, 380, 392, 393, 396.

96. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 17, folder 167a, f. 28, p. 3.

97. See *Izvestia*, 30. 7. 1934; B. Budurowicz. *Soviet-Polish Relations 1932-1939*. N. Y., L., 1963, 17-18.

98. M. M. Lee, W. Michalka. *Op. cit.*, 119-122, 128-130; H. Mommsen. "Bruning as Chancellor: The Failure of a Politically Isolated Strategy", *From Weimar to Auschwitz*. Princeton, NJ, 1991, 124-132.
99. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 67, f. 3, p. 64.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-71.
102. *Ibid.*, folder 68, f. 7, p. 306.
103. W. E. Scott. *Op. cit.*, 49-55; E. W. Benett. *German Rearmament and the West, 1932-1933*, Princeton, NJ, 1979, 176-180; Z. Mazur. *Pakt Cztereich*. Poznań, 1979, 88-89, 96-97.
104. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 17, folder 164, f. 3, pp. 80-79.
105. *Ibid.*, folder 167a, f. 28, p. 4.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
107. The authenticity of the report, which appeared in the *Berliner Volkszeitung* and was reprinted by the *Inprecorr*, June 9, 1932, about the content of Papen's lecture to the *Deutsche Herrenclub* was later confirmed by the German documents (J. Korbel. *Op. cit.*, 276).
108. R. P. Skinner to the Secretary of State, Ankara, Oct. 31, 1933, SDNA: 760c. 6215/631. See also M. Wojciechowski. "Polska na przelomie lat 1932-1933", *Oknem historyka*. Poznan, 1988, 29-32, 90-91; H. Rieckhoff. *German-Polish Relations, 1919-1933*. Baltimore and L., 1971, 235. Cf. V. Ia. Sipols. *Sovetskii Soyuz v bor'be za mir i bezopasnost'. 1933-1939*. Moscow, 1974, 25.
109. M. L. Stafford to the Secretary of State, Kovno, Oct. 6., 1932, SDNA: 760m. 00/40; M. L. Stafford to the Secretary of State, Kovno, July 8, 1932, SDNA: 760c. 60m/371; H. S. Fullerton to the Secretary of State, Kovno, Febr. 26, 1932, SDNA: 760n. 00/23.
110. M. M. Lee, W. Michalka. *Op. cit.*, 135-136.
111. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 7, p. 443.
112. F. M. Sackett to the Secretary of State, Berlin, Aug. 9, 1932, SDNA: 861. 60/265.
113. On the *Wicher* incident of June 15, 1932 and its international repercussions, see H. von Rieckhoff. *Op. cit.*, 357-373.
114. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 67, f. 3, p. 334.
115. L. Fisher. *Men and Politics: An Autobiography*. N. Y., 1941, 160.
116. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 8, p. 11; *ibid.*: 0122, inv. 16, folder 163, f. 36, pp. 57, 107.
117. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 16, folder 163, f. 36, pp. 55-56, 105-106 (Russian and German texts).

118. A former naval officer, Count von Reventlov was among the pioneers of National-Socialist and National-Bolshevik ideologies. In 1923, on Radek's suggestion he wrote for the *Rote Fahne* (A. Ascher, G. Lewy. "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany — Alliance of Political Extremism against Democracy", *Social Research*, v. 23, No 4 (Winter 1956), 464-465.

119. AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 68, f. 7, p. 496. Reventlov also expressed the same ideas in an article in the *Rheichswart* at the end of September 1932 (ibid, f. 8, p. 52).

A meeting between Litvinov and Reventlov took place in the Soviet Embassy in the middle of August (Reventlov initially insisted on a "neutral place") (ibid, f. 7, p. 512). Later that month a prominent *Izvestia* journalist named Mikhailski and the chief of the Central Committee International Information Bureau, C. Radek, separately arrived in Berlin for informal conversations with German politicians (ibid, p. 496). Analysis of E. Gnedin's remarks (*Iz istorii otnoshenii SSSR i fashistskoi Germanii: Dokumenty i sovremennye kommentarii*. N. Y., 1977, 23) leads to the conclusion that Radek came to Germany incognito.

For Krestinski's statement to Dirksen, on July 25, 1932, that the pact with Warsaw entailed no change of political course, see H. von Riekhoff. *Op. cit.*, 361.

120. See instructions of Krestinski and Stern to Alexandrovski, June 6, 1932 (AVP RF: 082, inv. 15, folder 67, f. 3, p. 218).

121. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 16, folder 160, f. 10, p. 67.

122. Ibid, f. 13, pp. 53-52.

123. Ibid, f. 8, p. 59.

124. Ibid, folder 159a, f. 17, p. 99.

125. Polish-born, Raewski in the early 20s occupied the post of a counsellor of the Soviet embassy in Germany. In 1923 he conducted (with relative success) negotiations in Warsaw concerning Soviet transit to Germany through Polish territory.

126. No record about Raewski trip to Warsaw in 1932 was made in his personal official card (The archives of the *Izvestia* publishing house).

127. B. Miedziński. "Droga do Moskwy", *Kultura*, 1963, No 118, 74-76.

128. AVP RF: 0122, inv. 16, folder 159a, f. 17, p. 180.

129. Ibid, folder 160, f. 8, p. 73.

130. DDF: 4, 135.

131. See J. Haslam. *Op. cit.*, 115-116. The views of the Soviet High Command on the shift in the Soviet European policy are unknown. In September 1932, Tukhachevski, the Vice-Commissar for War – and, as the French believed, the Commander-in-Chief of Red Army forces in Europe in wartime – headed a military delegation to Germany. Besides observing manouvres, the Soviet military mission toured war factories, schools, and fortifications in Eastern Prussia. M. Tukhachevski's extensive report about this visit remains

classified. For the French intelligence and military attache's reports, see DDF: 1, Annexes to Nos 217, 275, and G. Castellan. *Le Rearmament clandestine du Reich 1930-1935: Vu par le 2e Bureau de l'État-Major Français*. P., 1954, 483-487. A. Yegorov, the Chief of of the Red Army Staff, told a British diplomat in February 1932 (allegedly, "under the influence of alcohol") that Russia sought an alliance with France, Rumania and Poland (J. Haslam. *Op. cit.*, 155 (note 14)). Cf. G. Post. *The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy*. Princeton, 1973, 301.

132. AVP RF: 082, inv. 16, folder 73, f. 7, p. 267; *ibid*, inv. 17, folder 77, f. 1, pp. 6-5; DGFP: 2, 226. In his article about the voyage of Pierre Cott, written in Moscow and probably inspired by Soviet circles, G. Luciani stated: "Engaged since Rapallo in a pro-German policy... the Kremlin has, in the last few years, made a complete about face". Papen's proposal to Herriot "was merely an alarming hint for Moscow" and "the assumption of power by the Hitlerites in Germany has only accentuated this evolution" of the Soviet policy, which "was already far from" that of Rapallo (*Le Petit Parisien*, 23. 09. 1933).

133. AVP RP: 082, inv.17, folder 77, f. 3, p. 42.